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Abstract Online trading interfaces are important instru-
ments for retail investors. For sound reasons, regulators
obligate online brokers to inform customers about certain
trade related risks. Research has shown that different
behavioral biases can decrease traders’ performance and
hence lead to pecuniary losses. The disposition to hold losing
stocks too long and sell winning stocks too early (‘disposi-
tion effect’) is such a deviation from rational behavior. The
disposition effect is analyzed for the prediction market
‘Kurspiloten’ which predicts selected stock prices and
counts nearly 2000 active traders and more than 200,000
orders. We show that the disposition effect can be aggravated
by visual feedback on a trader’s performance via colored
trend direction arrows and percentages. However, we find no
evidence that such an interface modification leads to higher
activity. Furthermore, we can not confirm that creating
awareness of the disposition effect with textual information
is suited to decreasing its strength.
Keywords Retail investor behavior  Human computer
interaction  Disposition effect  Electronic markets 
Market interface design
1 Introduction
In 2002, 28 % of U.S. retail trades were executed via retail
brokerage companies; one year later, U.S. online retail
brokerage companies already managed more than 31 mil-
lion accounts (Bakos et al. 2005). In contrast to direct-
access brokerage where traders virtually have direct and
thus low-latency access to stock exchanges, online retail
brokerage describes, often web-based, trading interfaces
offered to retail customers by banks and similar vendors. In
a more recent analysis, Camargo (2013) estimate the U.S.
self-directed online brokerage market to have reached over
40 million customers in 2012. Furthermore, they report that
growth rates have slowed down since 2010 which can be an
indication of saturation. From a customer’s perspective,
important distinguishing features of online retail brokerage
companies are fees, trading capabilities, and the function-
ality of their trading interfaces. As designing trading
interfaces gives brokerage companies an additional
opportunity to distinguish themselves from competitors, a
great deal of effort is put into designing ‘attractive’ trading
interfaces for customers. Although it is common knowl-
edge that a decision makers performance in general
depends inter alia on the user interface used (Speier and
Morris 2003), even a carefully designed interface that is
easy to use may not prevent traders from being susceptible
to behavioral biases.
The disposition effect is such a behavioral bias, which
often leads to individual losses and missed gains. Although
the disposition effect is well known in several research
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communities, it is not considered common knowledge.
Therefore, providers of online trading platforms might
have a particular interest to inform their customers about
that bias – and if possible provide tools to avoid it. On the
one hand, the strength of the bias is influenced by the
individuals’ internal decision making processes, their
awareness, and their knowledge about the specific bias. On
the other hand, the individuals’ environment (e.g., infor-
mation presentation) might impact the effect strength.
In this work, we conduct an experiment on an online
prediction market wherein we can control and implement
certain user interface modifications. Prediction markets are
virtual stock markets used to forecast the outcome of future
events. The chosen market ‘Kurspiloten’ forecasts prices of
selected stocks – thus in a way resembling futures mar-
kets – and has an interface similar to online retail brokers,
yet simplified 1. With nearly 2000 active traders and sub-
stantial financial incentives our field experiment closely
resembles trading in financial markets. In contrast to most
research on financial markets we are able to run a 2 by 2
between subject research design. We identify performance
indicators as a driver of the disposition effect and show that
their disuse can decrease the disposition effect and there-
fore its negative implications. However, the question per-
sists how individuals can be sensitized for this bias. For
instance, Bhandari et al. (2008) use decision support sys-
tems to debias traders.1
In a follow-up study, Bhandari and Hassanein (2010)
propose debiasing strategies for major investment-related
biases. Especially, they propose to apply a quantitative
reasoning agent to debias affective biases such as the dis-
position effect. Nevertheless, more simplistic approaches
might already decrease the disposition effect. For instance,
there is evidence that textual information can – even under
difficult circumstances – be effective in the area of health
warnings on tobacco. Hammond (2011) is able to show that
persons who noticed a textual warning sign in some cases
started to think about changing their behavior. But he also
emphasizes that the information must ‘‘capture [...] atten-
tion and educate’’ in order to be effective. Another study in
the health domain examining effects of pictures and textual
information found that only using textual arguments led to
minor changes in intended behavior (Boer et al. 2006). To
summarize, it has been shown that textual information can
have an effect, although it does not seem to be a strong one.
We address the following research questions in this paper:
(1) Is the knowledge about the existence of the disposition
effect suited to lower an individual’s disposition effect? (2)
Does a trend indicator arrow (like the ones often used in
online trading screens) positively affect the disposition
effect? Before addressing these questions we must first
verify that the disposition effect is indeed prevalent in this
market, and that whether it affects participants’ trading
performance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In
the next section, we present related research concerning the
disposition effect and prediction markets before we
describe the conducted experiment. In the third section, we
develop our hypotheses from the research questions posed
above. Thereafter, we give a short description of our
dataset and outline the methodology used, before we rep-
resent our findings in the results section. In the last two
sections, we discuss results and their implications and
make concluding remarks.
2 Related Research
In this section, we present related research on the dispo-
sition effect before we turn to prediction markets.
2.1 Disposition Effect
Across a wide range of markets, traders tend to hold on to
paper losses for too long and realize gains too early. This
tendency is a deviation from rational behavior, where the
trader makes his decision based on relative gains and losses
instead of the absolute valuation of his investment. Based
on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, the
work of Machina (1982), and others, Shefrin and Statman
(1985) examine this particular pattern and coined the term
disposition effect (DE) for it. They develop a descriptive
theory that enables a broader insight into this particular
effect in real markets. But their explanatory approach goes
beyond prospect theory and includes aspects of mental
accounting (Thaler 1985), of the asymmetry of pride and
regret (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler 1985), and of
self-control (Thaler and Shefrin 1981). The existence of the
disposition effect has been shown in stock markets (e.g.,
Lakonishok and Smidt 1986), for a U.S. discount brokerage
house (Odean 1998), for the Taiwan Stock Exchange
(Barber et al. 2007), as well in experimental settings (e.g.,
Andreassen 1988; Weber and Camerer 1998) or even in
prediction markets (e.g., Teschner et al. 2012). Although
the disposition effect can be shown in a wide range of
markets, its strength seems to depend on individual factors
such as professionalism, sophistication, and trading expe-
rience. Shapira and Venezia (2001) examine a dataset from
an Israeli brokerage house and find out that independent
investors tend to have a higher disposition effect than
professional investors. Seru et al. (2010) show that the
1 In an experiment based on (Lim and Benbasat 1996), they explore
the effectiveness of decision support systems in the financial context
to lower cognitive biases. Therefore, they use interactive feedback as
well as selected different graphical representations in investment
scenarios.
123
350 T. T. Kranz et al.: Beware of Performance Indicators, Bus Inf Syst Eng 57(6):349–361 (2015)
disposition effect declines with trading experience. But
even a lower disposition effect for professional traders does
not mean that the disposition effect’s degrading implica-
tions on trading performance vanish with growing experi-
ence. Both studies imply that the strength of the disposition
effect for an individual varies and can be influenced
actively. Garvey and Murphy (2004) analyze a successful
team of proprietary traders and find that even when the
traders are experienced and perform very well, their per-
formance could have been better, if they would have
avoided the trading pattern of disposition effect. Feng and
Seasholes (2005) show that a combination of sophistication
and trading experience can even eliminate an investor’s
reluctance to realize losses, but it can only diminish the
propensity of an investor to realize gains. Summing up, the
disposition effect has shown to hinder individuals trading
performance. Although it can be diminished by traders’
experience and sophistication, it cannot be totally avoided.
2.2 Prediction Markets
‘‘Prediction markets are remarkably accurate information
aggregation mechanisms’’ (Gjerstad 2005). They are vir-
tual markets, where stock prices represent the prediction
of an upcoming event. Wolfers and Eric (2004) describe
three possible contract types. First, a Winner-takes-all
contract that models events with a binary outcome, such
as the chance that a certain candidate will be elected in a
majority election. Second, an Index contract that is suited
to predict a mean value of a future outcome. Examples
are the vote share of a certain party in a proportional
representation or the number of unemployed persons at a
given time (cf. Teschner et al. 2011). Third, a Spread
contract that can be used to predict the median value of a
future event.
Prediction markets may make use of a market maker
mechanism (e.g., Hanson 2002) or simple continuous
double auctions, but are not tied to a specific mechanism.
They can operate with real money, like most sports betting
platforms do, or use play money without losing their pre-
dictive power (e.g., Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004; Chris-
tiansen 2007; Slamka et al. 2008). The market design
makes sure that participants have a proper incentive to
reveal their true beliefs. On the one hand, participants buy a
certain stock if the current market price is lower than their
individual estimation of the future outcome (i.e., their
expected payout). On the other hand, they sell if the price
exceeds their belief. Since every single trade can influence
the market price instantaneously, prediction markets pro-
vide immediate feedback as well as continuous predictions
of future events. Prediction markets can be used in nearly
every domain and have successfully been applied to predict
events for topics like elections (e.g., Forsythe et al. 1992),
sport events (e.g., Hartzmark and Solomon 2012),
macroeconomic indicators (e.g., Teschner et al. 2011),
sales forecasts (e.g., Chen and Plott 2002), supply chain
management (e.g., Hedtrich et al. 2011), or even innova-
tion assessment (e.g., Stathel et al. 2010).
2.3 Disposition Effect in Prediction Markets
Teschner et al. (2012) analyze the disposition effect in a
prediction market for macroeconomic indicators as
described in Teschner et al. (2011) with a sample size of 96
active traders. They conduct their analysis largely based on
the work of Odean (1998), who found the disposition effect
on an individual (DE ¼ .021) and aggregated (DE ¼ .050)
level.2 In line with previous research, they find a disposi-
tion effect on the individual level (DE ¼ .1582) as well as
on the aggregated level (DE ¼ .2248). Furthermore, they
find a significant asymmetry in the disposition effect
towards the percentage of gains realized. Interestingly,
there is neither a significant impact of the disposition effect
on absolute forecast error nor a correlation between pre-
diction accuracy and disposition effect. Hartzmark and
Solomon (2012) examine a dataset of a NFL betting market
from Tradesports.com and find that prices follow an
S-shaped curve instead of linearly matching the underlying
probabilities. They find this particular mispricing to be
consistent with the disposition effect. In another study,
Borghesi (2013) find strong evidence that the disposition
effect in Tradesports’ market for NBA totals contracts
leads to significant differences between prices and under-
lying values, also consistent with the disposition effect.
Summing up, there is evidence that the disposition effect
exists in prediction markets.
3 Research Questions and Hypotheses
With this work we try to answer the two research
questions:
(1) Is the knowledge about the existence of the dispo-
sition effect suited to lower an individuals’ disposi-
tion effect?
(2) Does a trend indicator arrow positively affect the
disposition effect?
2 As the disposition effect’s definition by Shefrin and Statman (1985)
describes rather a behavioral pattern than a precise way of quantifi-
cation, literature has adopted different approaches to verify the
disposition effect’s existence and measure its extent. As the
methodology used in the work at hand (cf. Sect. 5) is largely based
on Odean (1998), for comparison reasons we report the extent of the
DE for studies that use a similar approach as the difference of PGR-
PLR.
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As stated earlier, the disposition effect (DE) is not part of
general education and can therefore not be expected to be
known to the vast majority of participants of an online
prediction market. As research has shown, multiple factors
can decrease the DE. Inter alia, active training (e.g., Fen-
ton-O’Creevy et al. 2012) and trading experience (e.g.,
Dhar and Zhu 2006). Hence, literature suggests ‘‘[...] that
brokerage firms should try to educate their clients of the
disposition effect, thereby improving their clients’ after tax
portfolio performance [...]’’ (Dhar and Zhu 2006). We want
to shed some light on the question whether it is expedient
to inform about the DE with a short information text
directly on an online trade screen or if a ‘deeper under-
standing’ of the DE is needed. This could be an interactive
learning unit or active training on how to avoid the dis-
position effect. We expect that reading an information text
leads to a lower disposition effect, simply by creating
awareness of this particular deviation from rationality and
thus increasing self-control. Therefore, we define an
interface change ‘DE Info Text’ consisting of an infor-
mation text about the disposition effect on the trading
screen. In line with current research, we expect this
information text to reduce the disposition effect:
Hypothesis 1 Mean disposition effect is lower if ‘DE
Info Text’ is offered. (INFO \ CTRL)
Moreover, self-control might be decreased by con-
fronting a trader with the portfolio state in a transparent
fashion. The disposition effect is driven by the trader’s
perception of his portfolio development; e.g., if a trader
cannot remember the purchase price of his stocks, he is
obviously unable to tell if he is riding a gain or a loss. In
a more complex market environment, traders repeatedly
buy and sell different amounts of shares for different
prices making it hard (or even impossible) to calculate the
average purchase price in an intuitive way. That purchase
price has to be compared to the current stock market price
in order to determine the performance of one’s own
holdings. The easier it is for a trader to assess his port-
folio value – and thus, whether he is riding a gain or a
loss – the more he might be tempted to yield to the dis-
position effect.
Furthermore, it is well known that traders can fall
victim to mental accounting. Showing traders a trans-
parent state of their portfolio on a per-stock basis might
intensify this biased perception. In order to support tra-
ders by means of an objective and comparable method to
reflect the portfolio performance, we define an interface
change ‘Trend Indicator’ that consists of a relative per-
formance indicator of a trader’s portfolio price devel-
opment and a visual cue representing its direction. We
therefore expect the ‘Trend Indicator’ to increase the
disposition effect:
Hypothesis 2 Mean disposition effect is higher if ‘Trend
Indicator’ is present. (TREND [ CTRL)
From a theoretical point of view, we neither see a reason
for a mutual reinforcement nor a mutual weakening
between an information text about the disposition effect
and a trend indicator for the own portfolio’s price devel-
opment. In other words, we expect those interface changes
to take effect independently of each other. Hence, the
following hypotheses are inferred:
Hypothesis 3 (a) ‘Trend Indicator’ increases the mean
disposition effect, even if ‘DE Info Text’ is present.
(TREND_INFO [ INFO)
Hypothesis 3 (b) ‘DE Info Text’ is suited to reduce the
mean disposition effect, even if ‘Trend Indicator’ is pre-
sent. (TREND_INFO \ TREND)
We expect the trend indicator to induce a higher order
activity, since it reflects the state of a portfolio in a more
transparent way and thus might make trading opportunities
more obvious. Therefore, we expect the trend indicator to
affect traders’ activity positively as expressed in the fourth
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 ‘Trend Indicator’ leads to an increase in
the traders’ activity.
4 Experimental Design
We conducted a field experiment on a prediction market
called ‘Kurspiloten’. This is a web-based prediction market
designed to forecast the stock exchange value of selected
stock indices and commodities on a weekly basis. Partici-
pants registered free of charge and traded with play
money.3 Therefore, they could not lose any real money.
Prizes worth over 70,000€ (around 90,000$) are drawn
among well-performing participants to incentivize them to
reveal their true beliefs. Further details are presented in the
next subsection. The experiment, consisting of treatment-
specific user interface changes is described in the second
subsection. The treatments actually used are explained in
the last subsection.
4.1 Prediction Market Kurspiloten
As in financial markets, the Kurspiloten market is set up
as a continuous double auction with one stock repre-
senting the final (real-world) price of one of the twelve
3 Due to legal restrictions the market had to rely on play money;
nonetheless ‘€’ was used as currency name. To avoid confusion in this
article ‘P€’ is used as currency sign for play money and ‘€’ for real
money.
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predicted stocks at a given time. For instance, the stock
‘DAX 07 October 2011’ represents the real-world value
of DAX on 07 October 2011 at 5:35 pm. This particular
stock is tradable on the Kurspiloten market, starting 30
September 2011 until 07 October 2011 5:30 pm. Partici-
pants buy if they think that current Kurspiloten prices
underestimate the final value of the underlying stock
market index or commodity and sell if they think prices
overestimate the final value. By trading their price
expectations of twelve selected stock indices and com-
modities on a weekly basis, participants are able to share
their private information with others. Although the Kur-
spiloten market uses play money, participants are pro-
vided with the incentive to behave similarly to a real-
money market. We offer prizes worth more than 70,000€
for well performing traders in order to provide incentives
to truly reveal information. As the amount of play money
was not extensible by some analogy of a deposit, partic-
ipants had an incentive to economize their play-money
budget. Hence, participants were supposed to buy under-
valued stocks and sell overvalued stocks. Furthermore,
they should realize gains as well as losses in order to
increase their buying power. As performance measure, we
use the traders’ total assets (i.e., total amount of money
and stocks a trader owns at market prices). The wealthiest
trader at the end of each week is awarded a material prize
worth around 1,500€. The main prize worth over 40,000€
is given to the most successful trader at the end of the
game according to his overall assets, i.e., – since all
stocks are paid out – the total amount of money he owns.
Four additional prizes worth over 15,000€ in total are
awarded to the four next best traders at the end of the
game. Six stock indices, three commodities, a commodity
index, a future contract and one exchange rate can be
traded (see Table 1). The tradable contracts represent their
underlying stock one-on-one.
Upon registration each participant receives an initial
endowment of 100,000P€ and 1000 stocks of each tradable
asset. The trading period for all stocks is seven days. Each
Friday at 5:30 pm, the market is closed for trading.
Afterwards all 12 products (see Table 1) are paid out
according to the stock exchange prices at 5:35 pm. To
attenuate endgame effects we close the market for trading 5
min prior to the payout. All participants receive their new
endowment consisting of 1000 stocks each for the next
seven-day trading period.4 Finally the market is reopened
for trading. As we run the experiment for twelve weeks, we
execute 144 payouts in total. Any order submitted for a
paid out product can ex post be rated as ‘informed’ or
‘uninformed’ in relation to the payout price. For example,
take the stock ‘DAX 07.10.2011’, which was tradable from
30 Septembar 2011 until 07 October 2011 at 5:30 pm and
represents the (real-world) price of DAX on 07 October
2011 at 5:35 pm (GMT?1), which is 5673.08. Imagine
(a) a buy order for this stock with a limit price of 5715 and
(b) a buy order for this stock with a limit price of 5660.
Order ‘a’ is an uninformed order, since its limit price is
higher than the payout price (i.e., the final value of the
Table 1 Tradable stocks
Stock ISIN Underlying (currency, unit)
DAX DE0008469008 30 major German companies (€, Index)
MDAX DE0008467416 50 major German companiesa (€, Index)
TecDAX DE0007203275 30 largest German technology companies (€, Index)
EuroStoxx 50 EU0009658145 50 Eurozone companies (€, Index)
Dow Jones industrial average US2605661048 30 major U.S. companies ($, Index)
Nikkei 225 XC0009692440 Tokyo Stock Exchange (¥, Index)
EUR/USD EU0009652759 EUR-USD exchange rate ($, €)
Euro-bund future DE0009652644 Future contract on German national loan (€, €)
Gold XC0009655157 Gold (€, Ounce)
Silber XC0009653103 Silver ($, Ounce)
Brent crude oil XC0009677409 Brent-Oil ($, Barrel)
Rogers international NL0000424505 38 commodities from 13 international
Commodity index exchanges (€, Index)
In Kurspiloten market all stocks are traded in P€, regardless of the currency of their underlying. (e.g., Nikkei 225 at 13,045¥ will have a payout
value of 13,045P€)
a Excluding DAX and TecDAX
4 Due to a bad money/stocks-ratio we introduced a second account
for each user called ‘‘Geldspeicher’’ (engl. ’Money Bin’). Starting on
23 October 2011 all money exceeding 10,000,000P€ is booked to the
Money Bin in the weekly payout procedure and can not be used for
trading anymore. Nevertheless, the money contained in the Money
Bin is considered for the ranking.
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underlying) and will therefore most likely result in a loss.
In contrast, order ‘b’ can be regarded as an informed order,
since its limit price is below the payout price and its exe-
cution will result in a gain of 13.08P€ per stock when it
comes to the payout. Registration for Kurspiloten was free
of charge and open for anyone. In the registration process
participants only had to enter a valid email address and a
username. Participants could register any time from three
days before market opening. As a trader receives repeated
endowments of stocks for following trading periods after
each payout, participants who registered after market
opening would be disadvantaged. In order to give those
traders a chance to catch up with the competitors, we
adjusted their initial endowment to the account balance a
hypothetical user who registered on the first day would
have. This is achieved by creating a dummy user account
on the first day of the market which receives the same
initial endowment as each user and is paid out in the same
way a normal user is. If a user registers after market
opening, he receives the initial portfolio for the current
week as well as the amount of money the dummy user
account currently owns (i.e., all past endowments multi-
plied with their corresponding payout values).
We set proper incentives by using a public ranking list
containing the usernames based on the traders’ absolute
assets. This ranking’s primary use is to award the prizes
worth more than 70,000€. The ranking is accessible to all
traders throughout the market runtime. Therefore, the second
incentive is a social comparison according to trading-per-
formance. In order to inform participants about the market
rules, we provide general instructions explaining the basic
market rules and conditions of participation. Note that the
instructions are neither individualized in any way nor
adapted to the specific treatment a participant is part of.
Besides individual decisions, the disposition effect also
depends on market price developments. For example, traders
on a bearish market have simply less chances to realize paper
gains but more to make paper losses; the opposite applies to
bullish markets. Since traders might concentrate their trading
on different stocks, this dependency could be problematic for
the analysis. In extreme situations traders may experience
different or even opposed market effects due to their dif-
ferent portfolios. Nevertheless, for two reasons we expect the
impact that market price developments have on the dispo-
sition effect to be rather small on this market. First, the
tradable stocks (see Table 1) can roughly be grouped into
stock indices and commodities. Within those groups, the
single commodities/indices are somehow interdependent
(e.g., DAX and MDAX, Gold and Silver.) and thus are
unlikely to develop in opposed directions for a longer period
of time. Second, traders on the Kurspiloten market start with
an identical portfolio and receive an identical endowment
each week which tempts traders to trade all kinds of stocks
tradable. As all traders participate in the very same market,
we assume that price market trends do not influence the
disposition effect between individual traders significantly.
Finally, traders’ profits are used as a control variable in the
following regression models, which further smoothens the
potential negative impact of market price developments on
the comparability of the individual disposition effect.
4.2 User Interface Modifications
The experiment is setup as a 2  2 full factorial between
subjects design. Both treatment conditions are visual
changes to the trade screen (see Fig. 1 and ‘‘Appendix 2
of ESM)’’. The first change (‘‘DE Info Text’’) consists of
a linked text ‘‘Do you know about the Disposition
Effect?’’ (authors translation) just above the price chart
(see label (a) in Fig. 1). When a user clicks on this text,
a paragraph explaining the disposition effect fades in.
Appendix 1 of ESM contains the complete text. As the
experiment takes place in the field compromises must be
made in some areas. For that reason traders are not
forced to read the DE Info Text prior to trading on the
market, nor is it controlled whether they understand the
text or not. Instead the text is offered to traders under
the assumption that as they actively need to click on the
link in order to expand the text, the ones who do so are
actually interested and will read it. As the DE Info Text
is rather short and aims to express the disposition effect
as comprehensively as possible, we assume that the
majority of participants is able to understand this text
and its implications. The current time and user id is
recorded with every click on the link to DE Info Text for
further analyses. The second treatment condition
(‘‘Trend Indicator’’) extends the box ‘‘Your Perfor-
mance’’ (authors’ translation) on the lower right of the
trade screen by one column (see label (b) in Fig. 1). The
basic interface only contains the information ‘‘Average
Purchase Price’’ (authors’ translation, left column in the
box ‘‘Your Performance’’), whilst the second treatment
condition extends that box by a column named ‘‘Per-
formance’’, containing the relative performance of stocks
held. First, the percentage difference between the current
market price and the average purchase price for the
corresponding stocks is shown. Second, a tiny trend
direction arrow indicates whether this difference is
negative, zero, or positive. The arrow is colored red,
grey, or green, respectively. It is similar to stock trend
indicators used in many online trading interfaces.
4.3 Treatments
All Participants registered on the Kurspiloten market are
assigned to one of the three treatment groups or to the
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control group as shown in Table 2. Participants who reg-
istered in the pre-market phase are randomly assigned prior
to the start of the market. Participants who joined after start
of the market are assigned randomly at registration. Each
trader remains a member of the assigned treatment group
for the whole duration of the market. The first group is
confronted with both conditions described above (treat-
ment Trend_Info) and depicted in Fig. 1. One group sees
the trend info (treatment Trend), another one the info text
(treatment Info). No changes are made for the control
group (Control), i.e., the control group sees neither the info
text nor the trend info.
Fig. 1 Trade screen for treatment Trend_Info. (Containing both user
interface modifications made: a and b. A click on the linked text
(a) fades in an info text about the disposition effect. The whole text is
depicted in ‘‘Appendix 1 of ESM’’. Modification (b) shows the ‘Trend
Indicator’ element. Screenshots of the three remaining treatments can
be found in Appendix 2 of ESM.) Heading: ‘‘Price development of
Dax 07 October 2011’’; In box (a): ‘‘Do you know about the
Disposition Effect’’ (only available in treatments Info and Tren-
d_Info); Chart price chart for Kurspiloten prices (red dotted line) and
real-world prices (black line); middle left ‘‘Your Order for stock
...2011’’, radio buttons for buy and sell, information about the current
real-world price of selected stock (bold), input field for limit price,
information about deviation of limit price from real-world price, input
field for quantity, information about buying power (bold), ‘execute’
button; Right column 1st box: ‘‘My Portfolio’’, own holdings, own
holdings available, and money (P€); 2nd box: ‘‘Market Information’’,
least recent price and closing date of current product; 3rd box:
‘‘Orderbook’’; 4th box: ‘‘Current News’’, news stream from a major
German financial newspaper; 5th box: ‘‘Your Performance’’, average
purchase price of selected stock and relative performance (i.e.,
relative price difference of average purchase price and least recent
market price) (only available in treatments Trend and Trend_Info)
Table 2 Treatments and research design
DE info text w/o DE info text
Trend indicator Trend_Info Trend
w/o Trend indicator Info Control
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5 Dataset and Methodology
The Kurspiloten market was operational from 09 February
to 25 November 2011. In these 84 days 1912 active users
submitted a total of 215,432 orders. Those led to 131,561
transactions. A total of 144 payouts was executed (12 per
product). Hence, we calculate the disposition effect only
for traders who submitted at least 12 orders. Additionally,
we filter out traders that had no chance to realize a gain or a
loss and traders that did not realize at least one gain or one
loss. Due to these circumstances we can determine the
disposition effect for 514 traders. Descriptive statistics can
be found in the Appendix of ESM 3 (Tables 9 and 10 of
ESM). The sizes of the three treatment groups and the
control group are nearly balanced out: NTrend Info ¼ 123,
NTrend ¼ 126, NInfo ¼ 123, and NControl ¼ 142. About one
quarter of the traders, who could click on the info text link,
actually made use of this possibility: NclickedTrend Info ¼ 30,
NclickedInfo ¼ 30. The average account age lies between 69.10
days (Trend) and 67.26 days (Trend_Info) with an overall
mean of 68.05. Traders’ performance – measured by their
total trading profit – differs significantly (t-stat ¼ 2:34,
two-sample t test, p ¼ 2:04 %) between treatments Info and
Trend. Hence, variable Profit is used as a control variable
in the regression analysis. Besides, variable Trades per Day
is used to control for different trading activity. Although
the number of trades per day does not significantly differ
between treatments, it does for traders that clicked on the
info link in comparison to those who did not (t-stat ¼ 2:51,
two-sample t test, p ¼ 1.24 %).
We measure the disposition effect mainly based on
Odean (1998). The only exception is the length of the time
slices used. Since the trading period per product was rather
short (seven days), we used the users’ sessions instead of
trading days to differentiate between paper gains and los-
ses; e.g., if a trader’s average purchase price was below the
highest and lowest market price in the regarded session, it
is counted as a paper gain.5
The disposition effect (DE) is calculated as DE ¼ PGR -
PLR where PLR denotes the Proportion of Losses Real-
ized, and PGR the Proportion of Gains Realized. PGR and
PLR are calculated as follows:
PLR ¼ # realized losses
# realized losses þ # paper losses ð1Þ
PGR ¼ # realized gains
# realized gains þ # paper gains ð2Þ
6 Results
In this section we present our empirical findings, starting
with the overall and individual existence of the disposition
effect, before we take a detailed look at the disposition
effect with regard to the four treatments introduced earlier.
Finally, we shed some light on the traders’ order-based
activity per treatment.
6.1 Disposition Effect on Prediction Markets
In line with current research, we found an aggregated dis-
position effect (DE) for the Kurspiloten market (DE ¼ .154,
PLR ¼ .041, PGR ¼ .196) which is slightly smaller than in a
similar study of (Teschner et al. 2012) (DE ¼ .225, PLR ¼
.018, PGR ¼ .242) and higher than in studies using data of
online brokers (e.g., for an U.S. discount broker (Odean
1998) measured DE ¼ .05, for a German online broker
(Weber and Frank 2007) measured DE ¼ .09). On the
individual level the disposition effect is .148 and thus
comparable to a similar study on a play-money prediction
market conducted by (Teschner et al. 2012) (DE ¼ .158).
Further details are displayed in Table 3. As we can see PLR,
PGR and DE are significantly greater than zero (using a
two-sample t test, cf. second column in Table 3). Addi-
tionally, the disposition effect is asymmetric, since the
absolute correlation between DE and PLR is slightly
smaller than between DE and PGR.
Result 1 The disposition effect is prevalent in the
observed market on an aggregated as well as on an indi-
vidual level.
6.2 Disposition Effect’s Influence on Trading
Performance
As the disposition effect is prevalent in our market, the
question arises of how the disposition effect influences the
market. Since our research is focused on the trader, we have a
Table 3 Individual disposition effect
Value t-stat (x[ 0) Correlation (DE, x)
PLR .094 11.67 -.69
PGR .242 21.84 .85
DE .148 9.89 –
N ¼ 514 (complete groups), both correlations are significant at a 1 %-
level
5 As Odean (1998) had no information on when the users in his
dataset could possibly sell a certain stock, he chooses to count paper
gains/losses only on days when a user sells at least two stocks of his
portfolio. The idea behind this approach is to derive the points in time
(here: days) a user was logged into his account by analyzing the
trading history. The assumption is that users have seen their portfolio
on such days and – if they decided not to sell certain stocks –
preferred a paper gain/loss (or neither). Since we have available the
users’ session data, we do not need to derive that information from
trade data and thus ‘directly’ count stocks that are not sold within a
session as paper loss/gain (or neither).
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particular interest in the disposition effect’s influence on tra-
ders’ performance. Therefore, we take a look at the correla-
tions between the traders’ profits and the disposition effect, as
well as their relative rank and the disposition effect. (Relative
rank here indicates the rank within the 514 observed traders
instead of the overall rank among all registered traders.) We
neither found a significant correlation between profits and the
disposition effect (Correlation: .011, Pearson’s product-mo-
ment correlation, t value ¼ .24), nor between the disposition
effect and the traders’ rank (Correlation: -.028, Pearson’s
product-moment correlation, t value ¼ -.62).
6.3 Disposition Effect per Treatment
Table 4 (Fig. 2) shows the mean disposition effect in each
treatment group and the control group. The differences
between Trend_Info and Trend (d ¼ :019), Info and Control
(d ¼ :052), Trend_Info and Info (d ¼ :036), and Trend and
Info (d ¼ :017) are not significant. Solely, the disposition
effect for Trend_Info as well as for Trend is significantly
higher than for Control (both on a 5 %-level (two-sample t
test); Trend_Info: d ¼ :088, t-stat¼ 2.15, p value¼ .016 and
Trend: d ¼ :069, t-stat ¼ 1.78, p value ¼ .038). At first
glimpse, this result seems to support Hypothesis 2. But as we
mentioned earlier, even if all traders in treatments Info and
Trend_Info can read the disposition effect info text, we have
not controlled for whether they actually do so.
Therefore we repeated the former analysis with a slight
adaptation: Table 5 (and Fig. 3) shows the mean disposition
effect for a subsample, in which we only take traders from
the Info and Trend_Info treatment group into account that
clicked on the info text link. Furthermore, the disposition
effect for those traders is calculated on the basis of trades
they executed after they first clicked on the info text link.
Hence, N is slightly smaller.
As we can see, there is hardly difference between the
treatments Trend_Info and Info (d ¼ :001, not sign.). Also,
the differences between Trend_Info and Trend (d ¼ :038),
Info and Trend (d ¼ :038), Trend_Info and Control
(d ¼ :031), as well as Info and Control (d ¼ :031) are not
significant. Solely, the disposition effect for Trend is sig-
nificantly higher than for Control on a 5 %-level (d ¼ :069,
t-stat ¼ 1.78, two-sample t test, p value ¼ .038). Again,
this finding supports Hypothesis 2. However, these results
cannot confirm Hypothesis 1.
Result 2 Textual information about the disposition effect
has no significant influence on its strength (invalidating
Hypothesis 1).
Result 3 Treatment Trend shows a significantly higher
disposition effect than the control group (confirming
Hypothesis 2).
When we look at the tiny difference between Trend_Info
and Trend (d ¼ :001) in Table 5 in contrast to the rather
large difference of .069 between Trend and Control, one
might assume that the treatment condition ‘DE Info Text’
has an influence on the treatment condition ‘Trend Indi-
cator’. It seems reasonable to examine whether the info text
hinders the trend indicator’s increasing influence on the
disposition effect. To control for such an interaction effect,
we use the regression model shown in Table 6, model 2 and
4. (Please note that we adjusted the dummy-coding for ‘DE
Info Text’ appropriately.) Additionally we applied an
Table 4 Mean disposition effect per treatment
DE info text w/o DE info text
Trend indicator .185 .166
w/o Trend indicator .149 .097
N ¼ 514 (complete groups)
Fig. 2 Mean disposition effect per treatment (complete groups)
Table 5 Mean disposition effect per treatment (subsample)
DE info text w/o DE info text
Trend indicator .128 .166
w/o Trend indicator .128 .097
N ¼ 310 (subsample: all traders who have not clicked on the ‘DE info
text’ link mentioned in subsection ‘User Interface Modifications’ are
filtered out)
Fig. 3 Mean disposition effect per treatment (subsample)
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ANOVA. Neither method shows an interaction between the
treatment conditions ‘DE Info Text’ and ‘Trend Indicator’.
That means that neither of the treatment conditions have a
stronger or weaker effect under the premise that the other
treatment condition is present or absent. Furthermore, we
control for potential differences in treatment groups with
models 3 and 4. Nevertheless, all models in Table 6 show a
positive influence of the trend indicator on the individual
disposition effect.
For the sake of completeness, Table 7 contains the result
for the complete treatment groups. The result of the OLS
regression and the ANOVA are qualitatively similar to
what we have seen for the subsample (Table 6), including
the trend indicator’s influence on the disposition effect.
Table 6 Measuring interaction effects (subsample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct effects Interaction (1) ? Controls (2) ? Controls
Trend indicator .060: .069: .061: .070:
(visible ¼ 1, hidden ¼ 0) (1.66) (1.78) (1.70) (1.81)
DE info text -.005 .031 -.014 .020
(visible ¼ 1, hidden ¼ 0) (-.09) (.41) (-.27) (.27)
Trend indicator -.069 -.067
 (-.65) (-.63)
DE info text
Trades per day .003: (1.89) .003: (1.87)
Profit .000 .000
(-.35) (-.36)
(Intercept) .102 .097 .088 .084
(3.96) (3.66) (3.33) (3.07)
Adj. R2 .25 % .06 % .76 % .56 %
N 310 310 310 310
OLS regression estimates on subsample; dependent variable: disposition effect; t-statistics in parenthesis
: p\:1;  p\ :05;  p\ :01;  p\ :001
Table 7 Measuring interaction effects (complete groups)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct effects Interaction (1) ? Controls (2) ? Controls
Trend indicator .054: .062: .055: .062:
(visible ¼ 1, hidden ¼ 0) (1.83) (1.94) (1.83) (1.95)
DE info text -.017 .014 -.025 .005
(visible ¼1, hidden=0) (-.37) (.21) (-.54) (.08)




per day (1.57) (1.56)
Profit .000 .000
(-.29) (-.31)
Intercept .123 .120 .114 .111
(5.75) (5.43) (5.16) (4.87)
Adj. R2 .28 % .17 % .37 % .26 %
N 514 514 514 514
OLS regression estimates on complete groups; dependent variable: disposition effect; t-statistics in parenthesis
: p\ :1;  p\ :05;  p\ :01;  p\ :001
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Result 4 We found no interaction effects between the
disposition effect and showing visual cues (confirming
Hypothesis 3a, invalidating Hypothesis 3b).
We have reason to believe that the trend indicator itself
increases the individual disposition effect strength. There-
fore, we compare the average disposition effect of all tra-
ders who can see the trend indicator (mean DE ¼ .176),
with those who cannot (mean DE ¼ .121). In other words,
we compare the joined treatment Trend and Trend_Info
with the treatment Info and the Control group. This anal-
ysis results in a significantly higher value for traders who
see the trend indicator on a 5 %-level (d ¼ :054, t-stat ¼
1.82, two-sample t test, p value ¼ .034, N ¼ 514). Again,
the repetition of this analysis for the subsample from above
leads to analogous results (d ¼ :060, t-stat ¼ 1.66, two-
sample t test, p value ¼ .049, N ¼ 310).
Result 5 Displaying visual cues (specifically trend
arrows) increases the individual disposition effect (con-
firming Hypothesis 2).
6.4 Activity per Treatment
As mentioned in the section Hypotheses, we suspect tra-
ders with the treatment Trend to have submitted a higher
number of orders (H4). Therefore we compare the number
of (a) orders submitted and (b) logarithmized number of
orders submitted between all treatment groups. The log-
arithmization is used, since it diminishes the effect of
extreme values. We found one significant difference
between Info and Control (d ¼ 382:24, t-stat ¼ 1.71, two-
sample t test, p value ¼ .045) for the comparison ‘a’ and
four differences for case ‘b’: logarithmized trading
activity in treatment Info is slightly higher than in Control
group on a 0.1 %-level (d ¼ 1:126, t-stat ¼ 3.91, two-
sample t test, p value\:001Þ. Additionally, the logarith-
mized trading activities for treatment Trend_Info and Info
are significantly higher than for treatment Trend (Trend:
d ¼ 1:059, t-stat ¼ 3.55, two-sample t test, p value\:001,
Trend_Info: d ¼ :819, t-stat ¼ 2.81, two-sample t test, p
value ¼ .003). Finally, the logarithmized trading activity
for treatment Trend_Info is significantly higher than for
Control (d ¼ :885, t-stat ¼ 3.15, two-sample t test,
p value\:001).
Since this analysis uses the afore-stated subsample (only
traders who clicked on the ‘DE Info Text’ link), the result
may also be interpreted in a different way: the more orders
a trader submits, the more often she sees the ‘DE Info Text’
link. Therefore one may argue that it is more likely for her
to click on this link, which will result in such a pattern. To
clarify that question, we analyzed the complete group, but
found no significant differences (see Table 8). Hence, we
reject Hypothesis 4.
Result 6 The trend indicator does not lead to a higher
trading activity (invalidating Hypothesis 4).
7 Discussion and Implications
As our results show, the disposition effect can be aggra-
vated by a minute modification of the user interface. The
modification consists of a simple percentage value and a
trend direction arrow showing the trader’s portfolio value,
as used by online trading sites throughout the web as trend
indicator for stock prices or for similar applications. Sur-
prisingly, even such a small change significantly increases
the strength of the disposition effect. As mentioned earlier,
this interface change provides traders with a transparent
overview of their portfolio positions. One explanation
might be that for unexperienced traders this enhanced
transparency could lead to an initial recognition of the state
of their portfolio and thus only made them susceptible to
the disposition effect in the first place. As no information
on trading experience is available, we can only speculate
on the causality of the observed correlation while the true
reason remains yet to be discovered in further research.
Nevertheless, we expected that those interface changes
would not only have a downside. On the upside, we
assumed that traders seeing the interface elements descri-
bed above would submit more trades, since it showed the
current state of the traders’ portfolio in a fast and easily
recognizable manner. But interestingly we were unable to
verify this assumption in our setting. As private investors
are regularly confronted with trading interfaces containing
such elements, these results are especially interesting for
providers of market interfaces. For market interface pro-
viders such as retail brokers, these results imply to not use
trend indicators. Nevertheless, currently most online bro-
kers make excessive use of such interface elements, at least
for the reason of easier recognition of relative (price)
changes. As retail brokers have incentives to increase
trading frequency, another reason for the application of
these interface elements might be their impact on the
average trading frequency and/or volume. In order to help
retail investors to avoid the disposition effect – which has
previously been shown to reduce investor prosperity –
online brokers should consider redesigning their interfaces.
Table 8 Activity per treatment
DE info text w/o DE info text
Trend indicator 5.479 4.922
w/o Trend indicator 5.502 4.855
N ¼ 514 (complete groups); mean logarithmized number of orders
submitted per Treatment
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These results also have an implication for regulators. They
should carefully think about obligating online brokers to
elucidate customers about behavioral biases which are
known to degrade their performance. As our results sug-
gest, textual advice does not seem to be the best possible
solution in this case. (Besides, our results put a question
mark over the effectiveness of textual information and
advice already given to traders.) However, as we only
controlled for offering a text and thus could merely assume
that traders offered that piece of information actually read
and understood it, we cannot conclude that textual infor-
mation about the disposition effect has no effect on trading
behavior. Perhaps, a more striking ‘warning message’ on
the disposition effect would be more apt to decrease the
disposition effect. Regulators might furthermore think
about banning certain types of visual cues that are known
to lead to a great share of ‘wrong’ decisions and a sub-
stantial degradation of performance. Further research is
needed to show if the visual cue examined in this paper
satisfies the requirements to belong to this category. Nev-
ertheless, retail brokers should be interested in good user
experience and hence motivated to deliver a ‘good’ user
interface which is supporting instead of misleading. Inno-
vative retail brokers might even use results like these to
create a unique sales proposition, thus playing a pioneer
role in providing user interfaces that reduce the disposition
effect.
8 Conclusion
The disposition effect is a well-explored deviation from
rational behavior. As many studies show, the disposition
effect can have a negative impact on the decision perfor-
mance in trading environments. This paper analyzed the
disposition effect on aggregated and individual level in an
online prediction market with nearly 2000 active traders and
more than 200,000 orders. In line with research, we found a
disposition effect at both levels. Furthermore, we conducted
a field study with over 500 traders for which we could
measure the individual disposition effect. Although we
could not verify that creating awareness for the disposition
effect by means of textual information could decreases its
strength, we could show that even tiny visual cues can
significantly increase the strength of the disposition effect.
Nevertheless, our study leaves room for further research.
On the one hand, the trend indicator was solely used to
represent the average purchase price of the traders’ port-
folios in contrast to the current market price. A future study
could examine whether the disposition effect is also affec-
ted if trend indicators are used to represent price changes of
tradable stocks. On the other hand, we have seen that only
about one quarter of traders clicked on the link to the
offered info text. Furthermore, even if a trader clicked on
the link, we have no possibility to validate if the trader has
either (a) understood the text and its implications, or
(b) read the text at all. A lab experiment could be set up to
control for these factors; an additional questionnaire may
provide certainty whether a participant has read and
understood the concept of the disposition effect and its
implications for her trading performance. In a follow-up
field study, a repositioning of the offered link which shows
the information text about the disposition effect in a more
conspicuous location in the interface is worth considering.
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